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The paper addresses the dynamic-incentive effect of environmental policy instruments 
when innovation is uncertain and occurs in very complex industrial subsystems. The 
case of end-of-life vehicles (ELVs) is considered focusing predominantly on the effects 
of the European Directive adopted in 2000 which stipulated economic instruments as 
free take-back, and on the voluntary agreements in place in many EU countries. The 
ELV case study is an example of a framework where policy-making faces an intrinsic 
dynamic and systemic environment. Coherent sequences of single innovations taking 
place in both upstream (car making) and downstream (car recycling/recovery) of the 
ELV system can give rise to different “innovation paths”, in accordance with cost-
benefit considerations, technological options and capabilities associated to the different 
industrial actors involved. The impact of economic instruments on innovation paths, in 
particular free take-back, is considered. Deficiencies or difficulties concerning the 
transmission of incentives between different industries can prevent the creation of new 
recycling/recovery/reuse markets, giving rise to other less preferable and unexpected 
outcomes. The implication for policy is a need for an integrated policy approach, as 
enforceable VAs, in order to create a shared interindustry interest for innovation and to 
reduce the possible adverse effects which economic instruments exert on innovation 
through cost benefit impacts on key industrial and waste-related agents involved in the 
ELV management system. These advantages should be taken into account vis à vis the 
emergence of Integrated Product Policy (IPP) as a leading concept of EU environmental 
policy and the associated shift from "extended producer responsibility" to "extended 
product responsibility". 
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Dynamic-incentive effects of environmental policy are attracting an increasing 
research interest. Innovation is often the main response to environmental policies, and 
policy instruments may matter for ‘induced innovation’ effects, but shared conclusions 
about various theoretical and empirical issues are still lacking. An extensive review of 
theories and evidence on technological change and the environment, including the role 
of policy instruments, is presented in Jaffe et al. (2003), who distinguish between 
analyses of ‘induced innovation’ and ‘evolutionary’ approaches. Requate (2005) gives 
account of the present state of theoretical research on the dynamic incentives of 
different policy instruments, in particular economic instruments (EIs). Recent 
contributions address the determinants of ‘environmental innovation’, including policy 
instruments, on econometric grounds (for example, Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; 
Jaffe and Palmer, 1997; Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2005). A growing stream of evolutionary-
minded applied research projects addresses technological and organisational 
innovations associated to policy experiences, and in particular the role of institutional 
settings, observed industrial strategies, and policy-design approaches in influencing 
innovation (see, among others, Hemmelskamp et al., 2000; Klemmer, 1999; Kemp, 1997; 
Rennings et al., 2003).  
Most of available contributions do not go beyond a ‘black-box’ representation of 
dynamic-efficiency mechanisms stimulated by policies and their instruments. The works 
on ‘induced innovation’ based on neoclassical production functions and optimising 
behaviour on R&D investments, have difficulties in dealing with systemic uncertainties 
and ‘on-the-path’ adjustments typically characterising agents’ behaviour in real 
innovation processes. Evolutionary approaches able to deal with this kind of systemic 3
uncertainties and adaptations, sometimes have difficulties in dealing with the ex ante 
representation of how agents’ cost-benefit considerations can guide innovation 
responses to policies and their instruments, thus limiting their usefulness to ex post 
comprehensive, multi-faceted interpretations of what actually happened. Therefore, the 
way EIs can work in favour or against innovation through agent reactions to EIs 
themselves is often left without a realistic ex ante representation. Furthermore, most 
part of research on EIs and innovation deals with pollution and climate change policies, 
also with the aim of modelling ‘endogenous technological change’, whereas other 
important policy areas, in particular waste and recycling, are still disregarded.  
The aim of this paper is to make a step inside the ‘black box’ of ‘induced innovation’ 
and dynamic efficiency when innovation in response to EIs depends on the decisions 
of interdependent industrial actors
1. More specifically, by taking an evolutionary 
perspective, we address the ways specific EIs reflecting the ‘producer responsibility 
principle’ (PRP) in waste and recycling policy can influence innovation when the 
relationships between various manufacturing industries with different interests about 
innovation are involved
2.  
We analyse a specific case study, the EU policy on End-of-Life Vehicles (ELV 
hereafter), that can be representative of this class of ‘multiple industry – PRP instrument’ 
dynamic efficiency problems. After the controversial policy process leading to the EU 
Directive 2000/53 and various experiences of voluntary agreements (VAs) during the 
1990s, ELV policy is now (beginning 2005) at the stage of Directive transposition in 
Member States. The ELV case can be a representative one for four reasons: (i) 
innovation is the only way to attain policy targets, and the innovative response should 
be systemic because, to attain those targets, it must involve interdependent innovations 
                                                 
1 Here we will use a very general concept of ‘(policy) induced innovation’ that includes any kind 
of technological and organisational innovations that would not take place without policy and it 
is, therefore, ‘induced’ by policy itself. Our use of the concept is not limited to biased 
technological change in response to a change in relative factor prices caused by a price-based 
policy instruments.  
2 See Stevens (2004) for a general framework of the relationships between ‘(extended) producer 
responsibility principle’ and innovation.  4
generated by different industrial agents; (ii) the superiority of EIs over VAs or vice versa 
has been the source of a many-years debate between industry and policy-makers, but it 
has never been studied on a sound analytical basis; EIs and VAs were both finally 
included in the Directive 2000/53 as a ‘political’ compromise; (iii) the ELV case has 
been analysed from the perspective of voluntary agreements (Aggeri and Autchel 1997; 
Aggeri, 1999; EEA 1997) with a minor attention paid to innovation or, conversely, from 
the perspective of company-level innovation capabilities (Den Hond 1996); EIs, instead, 
received minor attention while the policy debate has been largely focused on them; (iv) 
it shares similarities with other EU policies, in particular packaging policies and the EU 
Directives on electric and electronic waste – WEEE (see European Commission, 2000).  
Although the still open state of ELV policy implementation does not allow us to 
perform a true ex post analysis on EIs and induced innovation, extensive information 
exists about policy-induced industrial innovation efforts, about industrial actors’ views 
and strategies on the (expected) impacts of EIs, and about some impacts of specific EIs’ 
at a certain implementation stage (generally early stage)
3. From this mixed ex ante/ex 
post knowledge base, we shall propose an enlargement of theoretical hypotheses and 
model-making assumptions about EIs and dynamic efficiency for a class of policies 
characterised by: (a) the use of EIs reflecting the ‘producer responsibility principle’, also 
in combination with other instruments aiming at the same policy objectives; (b) the 
involvement of many industries with very different technological profile and 
capabilities, market position and power, and economic interests towards the 
investments stimulated by policy; (c) innovation is the only or the critical factor for 
achieving policy targets.  
                                                 
3 After a preliminary work on the ELV issue (Zoboli, 1998), the research work presented in 
Zoboli et al. (2000) was based, inter alia, on an extensive set of interviews carried out in 1999-
2000, i.e. the most critical phase of the policy debate in Europe. The 43 interviews included: 23 
interviews with car makers (10), materials and car-component industries, and managers of ELV 
agreements in 6 European countries; 9 interviews with European professional associations of 
material and recycling industries; 11 interviews with officers of the European Commission in 3 
different directorates (Enterprise, Environment, and Research). We monitored the development 
of ELV policies and industrial initiatives for the subsequent years, and we carried out a specific 
research work on Sweden (Zoboli et al., 2003) based on direct interviews.  5
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the ELV case study focussing 
on the development of the EU Directive and national policies. Section 3 presents the 
features of ELV-related innovation, outlining different ‘innovation paths’. Section 4 
addresses the role of economic instruments in orienting ELV-related innovation. Section 
5 concludes and highlights some policy making issues. The Appendix illustrates the 
basic economics of the free take-back instrument.  
 
2. The ELV problem and policy responses  
The exact number of old cars deregistered in EU Member States and becoming ELVs 
to be treated (dismantling, de-pollution, reuse of parts, wreck shredding, recycling of 
materials, energy recovery or landfilling of final residues) is surprisingly still uncertain. 
The estimate given in a draft of the EU Directive proposal in 1997 was of 8-9 million 
automobiles, but it was questioned given the high number of ELVs deregistered in EU 
countries and exported to non-EU countries for treatment or re-use as second-hand 
cars. The number of ELVs to be domestically treated in EU countries was roughly 7,5 
million units in 1998 (our estimate, see Zoboli et al. 2000), a figure confirmed by the 
latest ACEA (Association of Car Manufacturers Europe) surveys, which indicate around 
7.7 million units to be treated in EU15 and Norway out of 11.5 million cars de-
registered
4.  
The economic value of an ELV to final owners may be either positive or negative. 
When car deregistration and delivery involves a payment to a dismantler, because there 
are few or none valuable parts to reuse, an incentive to illegally abandon the car in the 
environment arises. There are no reliable figures on the number of ELVs abandoned in 
the environment, but it is a recurring phenomenon in some countries (see Lee et al., 
1992). 
                                                 
4 The huge difference between the number of de-registered cars and those treated in Member 
States is due to shredding without pre-treatment, illegal treatment, abandoned vehicles, and 
export. A large part of the whole difference for EU15 is due to Germany (3.2 million de-
registered and only 1.2 million treated domestically in 2000), Italy (1,8 million de-registered and 
915,000 treated domestically), and France (1.8 million de-registered and 1.3 million treated).  6
The estimates on the rates of ELVs recycling/recovery/reuse (RRR) in the EU are still 
inaccurate
5. The overall rate of RRR is generally estimated at 75% of the car weight that 
corresponds to the metal (ferrous and non-ferrous) share recovered by dismantling 
(spare parts) and shredding. The automobile-shredding residue (ASR) is assumed to 
correspond to the remaining 25% of car weight (an estimated 2.2 million tons in the 
EU). ASR is generally landfilled and represents a major externality addressed by ELV 
policies. The presence of substances such as PCB makes the environmental impact of 
ASR a critical issue despite the not-too large quantities. Classifications of ASR are still 
non-homogenous across countries but a procedure for including it in the European 
Hazardous Waste list is under way. The presence of plastic residues contributes to the 
relatively high calorific value of ASR as an energy feed-stock.  
Parts and materials from ELVs give rise to reuse/recovery/recycling chains that have 
different degrees of actual development, innovation opportunities, and constraints. Car 
production and maintenance is also an important market for some 
reused/recycled/recovered materials.  
Significant changes in car material regime have occurred during the last few decades 
and the material composition of new cars produced during the 1990s (i.e. ELVs of the 
present decade, assuming a life of approximately 10-15 years) further shifted towards 
the use of polymeric materials and aluminium. Even though they are used extensively 
in car making (also reducing pollution by decreasing weight), many plastics have 
significant difficulties in recycling from ELVs. Aluminium, on the other hand, is the main 
metal used increasingly in car material mix and recycled AL is extensively used car 
making. These trends for material composition clearly affect the recovery and recycling 
possibilities which in turn have an impact on the technical and-economic implications 
of different policy provisions. 
ELVs were identified as a priority waste stream by the Commission’s “Community 
Strategy for Waste Management” in 1989. After many-years of problem definition and 
                                                 
5 The definitions of ‘recycling’, ‘recovery’, and ‘reuse’ are those of the Directive 2000/53.  7
proposed solutions, the Commission produced an ELV Directive proposal in 1997 
(European Commission, 1997). The latter addressed ELV as a waste problem to be faced 
on the basis of “extended producer responsibility” and it involved product making to a 
large extent through: quantified targets on RRR of ELVs; technical/environmental 
standards for dismantling and treatment operations; limitations on some heavy metals in 
car materials and components; limitations on ASR energy recovery; the obligation of 
industry to take back free of charge ELVs from final owners; the future direct regulation 
of car “recyclability/reusability/recoverability”; and the implicit exclusion of 
national/industrial voluntary agreements (VAs hereafter).  
Industries opposed most of the provisions as they were formulated, in particular: 
free take-back; the timing of RRR targets applied to cars already on the market (the so 
called “retroactivity”); the limitations on energy recovery of ASR; the limitations on 
heavy metals in alloys; the exclusion of VAs. The preference of most industries was for 
“shared responsibility” and industrial voluntary agreements. The ELV Directive was 
finally adopted by the Council and the Parliament in September 2000 after a 
conciliation procedure
6. 
Summing up, the main provisions of the Directive 2000/53 are: (a) 
Collection/dismantling facilities must be authorised, final owners will receive a 
certificate of destruction, treatment facilities must fulfil specific requirements. Many car 
components must be removed by dismantlers; (b) the recovery/reuse and 
recycling/reuse rates of all ELVs will have to respectively achieve 85% and 80% in terms 
of weight by January 2006; then, the reuse/recovery rate of all ELVs will have to be 95% 
of the weight while reuse/recycling 85% by  January 2015; energy recovery is thus 
allowed up to 5% of weight by 2006 and up to 10% by 2015; (c) Amendments on car 
type-approval regulation will be prepared to ensure that vehicles will be 
‘reusable/recyclable’ to a minimum of 85% and reusable/recoverable to a minimum of 
                                                 
6 See Onida (2000) for an analysis of the legal and policy background of the ELV Directive 
proposal. 8
95% of weight; (d) Annex II specifies a list of materials and components exempted from 
the limitations on the content of lead, chromium, and mercury; (e) End-of-life vehicles 
shall be delivered  for dismantling without any cost to the final owner (free take-back) 
and producers shall meet “all or a significant part” of the cost of implementation; (f) 
Member States may transpose key provisions by means of (voluntary) agreements 
between the national authorities and industries; agreements shall be enforceable and, in 
case of non-compliance, Member States must implement the Directive by legislation. 
During the last few years, other pieces of secondary legislation regarding ELVs have 
been produced mostly regarding the application of Directive articles, in particular 
Annex II on materials.
7 
Before the adoption of Directive 2000/53, 10 EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom) had specific regulations and/or VAs for ELV. Three other countries were 
discussing industrial agreements (Finland and Ireland) or introducing legislation 
(Denmark). Six countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden) combined VAs with sections of specific legislation. Austria, France, Italy, and 
the Netherlands introduced VAs or countrywide initiatives in the early 1990s before the 
first draft of the Directive
8. An extensive description of the national schemes and 
policies at the time of the Directive’s introduction, which are still the basis of the 
national policy approaches, is presented in Zoboli et al. (2000) while a bi-annual 
update of the details of ELV policy implementation in EU countries is produced by 
                                                 
7 In particular: Commission Decision 2003/138/EC establishing component and material coding 
standards; Commission Decision 2001/753/EC regarding a questionnaire for Member States 
reports on the implementation of Directive 2000/53/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on end-of-life vehicles; Commission Decision 2002/151/EC on minimum requirements 
for the certificate of destruction issued in accordance with Article 5(3) of Directive 2000/53/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on end-of-life vehicles; Commission Decision 
2002/525/EC amending Annex II of Directive 2000/53/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on end-of-life vehicles.  
8 For the role of legislation threats in stimulating voluntary agreements, see Segerson and Miceli 
(1997).  9
ACEA (www.acea.be)
9. The main feature of most national voluntary policy schemes is 
the absence of economic instruments (a partial exception are Germany, Sweden, and 
the Netherlands, see text): VAs are mainly based on formal and informal contractual 
arrangements aimed at sharing/distributing tasks according to single industries role in 
the ELV chain, alleged solution capabilities and, inevitably, market power, with the car 
industry usually playing the role of coordinator. Free market relationships are 
emphasised in opposition to top-down regulatory actions associated to EU policies (see 
also Par. 4.4).  
 
3. The induced innovation process  
From a technical point of view, both the compliance with the provisions the 
Directive 2000/53 and the commitments included in VAs involve an extensive set of 
technological and organisational adaptations by different industrial actors in the car 
making (upstream) and ELV treatment chains (downstream, post consumer). The 
complexity of the industrial interrelationships involved by the ELV issue can be evident 
in Figure 1.  
During the 1990s, the options for innovation became well-defined even in the 
absence of precise legal obligations and economic instruments in most national 
schemes (see Zoboli, 1998). After the EU Directive, the level and the legally-binding 
nature of policy targets on RRR determined the insufficiency of actual and expected 
results of industrial initiatives and multi-sector VAs. Two key issues emerge: (a) any 
single specific innovation is unable to achieve RRR targets set by Directive 2000/53; as a 
consequence interdependent inter-industry innovations (from car design to ASR 
treatment) must be pursued; (b) the achievement of the RRR targets implies an 
‘economic-value deficit’ in the short run, because there are underdeveloped markets for 
                                                 
9 To our knowledge, there are not operational proposals for the introduction of EU-type ELV 
regulation in the United States and Japan. However, carmakers in these two countries are 
developing voluntary and/or industrial initiatives to cope with the regulation in the EU export 
market and the evolution of their domestic waste policies. 10
the additional flow of materials and energy feed-stocks deriving from higher RRR rates. 
We shall analyse these issues by addressing:  
(a) the features of the innovation process in the ELV case;  
(b) the dynamic-incentive properties of economic instruments in such a process. 
 
3.1. Specific innovations 
Some specific innovations pursued by Europe-based car companies during the last 
decade are summarised in Figure 2.  
The creation of networks of dismantlers/shredders linked to individual car 
companies has been a major organisational innovation given the previously existing 
limited relationships between the car industry and post-consumer ELV treatments. 
However, contractual arrangements between the main actors (carmakers, dismantlers, 
shredders, and recyclers) differ from country to country.  
Innovative developments concerning design for dismantling (DFD) are taking place 
in all car companies. DFD may consist of small changes in the part-assembling systems 
or it may imply changes and adaptations of components and parts. The boundaries 
between DFD and design for recycling (DFR) are not clear-cut.  
DFR requires definition and measure of “recyclability”. European carmakers work on 
the development of “recyclability coefficients” for materials and components and 
include lists of not admitted or undesired substances/materials in the technical 
specifications imposed to component suppliers. Thus, a “responsibility transfer” 
between industries takes place. DFR is also increasingly linked to Life-Cycle Analysis 
(LCA). Most carmakers are investing in recycling-oriented LCA at the R&D level and, in 
some case, they are transferring results to practice. LCA is generally still limited to 
specific materials or car components
10. DFR pushes most carmakers to pursue a 
simplification of the material regime. “Easily” (i.e. economically) recyclable materials are 
favoured and, as a consequence, the trend toward the use of certain polymers and 11
composite materials is weakening. There is a propensity to reduce the number of 
polymers in favour of those having the best recycling possibilities and a process of 
inter-polymer substitution is under way.  
The amount of recycled materials used in new car manufacturing is increasing. 
Recycled plastics in new cars often come from ELV recycling loops in the form of 
“cascade recycling” (i.e. the use of recycled plastics in decreasingly critical car 
components). Economic balances of car plastic recycling are nevertheless weak for 
many polymers due to high dismantling and logistic costs
11.  
The energy recovery of ASR in waste incineration plants and the cement industry 
have attracted innovative efforts and investments. Positive environmental results of ASR 
energy recovery emerge from various LCA analyses offered by industry but other 
studies offered by EU policy institutions give opposite results. Attempts are underway to 
separate and recover the materials in ASR (non-ferrous metals and plastics) and to 
recycle them.  
 
3.2. Innovation paths 
None of above-mentioned innovations has the potential to attain the RRR targets of 
Directive 2000/53 if taken alone. Innovations with the highest potential contribution 
(plastic recycling) are the less developed for technical and/or economic reasons.  
The innovation process, therefore, must be composed of alternative/complementary 
sequences of interrelated innovations, that should allow the achievement of defined 
RRR targets. We define these sequences as “innovation paths”, or “vertically-integrated 
innovation options”, and take them as reference for evaluating the possible impacts of 
ELV policies.  
Three main innovation paths can be identified (Figure 3):  
(a) “material-market creation path”;  
                                                                                                                                             
10 For the shortcomings of the present state of LCA see in particular Ayres and Ayres (1999). 12
(b) “energy-market creation path”;  
(c) “radical substitution path”.  
 
3.2.1. Material-market creation path 
Taking as given the current car material composition, the sustainable achievement of 
a reduced amount of land-filled ASR is only partly a problem of incremental RRR at the 
margin for materials that already have a well-developed secondary market (ferrous 
metals). Instead, it requires market creation for the parts, components and materials 
currently not recovered, reused and recycled. This can be thought as an upstream-
oriented series of necessary (but not sufficient) innovations in the technical viability of 
recycled metals in existing or new uses, innovative changes in dismantling activities, 
innovations at the upstream car making stage through developments in DFD/DFR. In 
the end, the process requires interdependent changes in different industries. 
Technologies leading to material recovery of ASR can be considered as a form of 
material markets creation. The material-market creation path can combine relatively 
high ELV “recyclability” with relatively small and/or well-focused car-design changes. 
This is the path more desired by EU policy makers that draw Directive 2000/53.  
 
3.2.2. Energy-market creation path 
An alternative route of market creation is the development of the energy recovery of 
ASR. Markets for ASR as an energy feedstock are still very limited and should be 
created. This path mainly involves new links between shredders and energy consuming 
industries, or other sectors possibly using waste-derived fuel, that are mostly external to 
the ELV-related industries. Specific economic and technical constraints may arise, for 
instance competition with other waste-derived energy feed-stocks. The feedback 
created along the ELV chain would be less complex compared to the material-market 
                                                                                                                                             
11 See Okö Istitut (2003), for a detailed analysis of plastics recycling from ELVs based on LCA and 
‘eco-efficiency analysis’.  13
creation. It does not imply trade-offs with energy-emission requirements in car making 
because it allows for the continuation of the current trend towards composites and 
polymer-based light materials. Though EU policy targets allow energy recovery to be a 
share of incremental RRR rates, the pursuit of an energy recovery path is constrained by 
the provisions of Directive 2000/53.  
 
3.2.3. Radical substitution path 
The difficulties in pursuing “material market creation” and/or “energy market 
creation” paths, may stimulate more radical adaptations of design and material choice in 
the upstream part of the ELV system. A radical design choice is one associated to the 
reduction of car materials currently having weak recycling markets. The substitution 
process should consist of a reduced propensity to introduce complex and advanced 
materials not technically and/or economically suitable for recycling. The possible trade-
off between increased recyclability on the one hand, and simplification of production 
and lower emission levels on the other hand, suggests that this innovation path can 
influence other car-related innovation trajectories. It reduces the need for developing 
“new” recycling markets (some plastics) and can create, instead, a problem of 
marginally increasing quantities in well-established recycling markets (some metals). It 
also reduces incentives for innovations in ASR (energy) recovery. 
 
3.3. Selection uncertainties 
The “selection” of a dominant innovation path is still marked by uncertainties 
associated to the following factors:  
1.  Technological uncertainty and learning. Environmental, technological, and 
economic results associated to each innovation path are still not completely known and 
various specific innovations composing the three paths are not at advanced stages. The 
(un)certainty about results, in fact, emerges and evolve during the same process of path 
selection. The process is clearly an evolutionary one based on cumulative knowledge 14
and capability-creation through both focused R&D and learning by experience (Den 
Hond, 1996). 
2. Different national environments for innovation.. Different carmakers and industrial 
actors can have different capabilities in pursuing one or more paths, or their 
combinations, also depending on national (or even local) industrial and innovation 
‘environments’, which are not under their full control. For example, in some countries 
there is shredding industry highly integrated with steel production that might take a 
pivotal role in the process; in some countries there are experiences in automotive 
plastic recycling due to a very active chemical industry; the development of car-parts 
reuse is favoured in some countries where a well-established secondary markets for car 
parts already exists.   
3.  Expected cost-benefits and preferences of industrial actors. Industrial actors 
(carmakers, dismantlers, shredders, component producers, material recyclers, etc.) have 
heterogeneous preferences for one or more paths, because different paths imply 
different cost-benefits balances for them
12. Even though technological uncertainty also 
makes cost-benefit balances somewhat uncertain and evolving with 
research/experience, there are clearly diverging and converging interests by different 
industries about different technological options and innovation paths (see Zoboli et al. 
2000).  This makes the selection process a very interactive one even without 
introducing EIs that necessarily impact the cost-benefit balances of the different actors.  
 
4. Economic instruments and the selection of innovation paths 
The Directive 2000/53, as well as some national VAs, adopted an ‘(extended) 
producer responsibility principle’ and introduced forms of EIs. Generally speaking, the 
EU policy approach to ELV has been not too different from that characterising 
                                                 
12 It can be noted that no formal cost benefit analysis has been performed by policy makers 
before the introduction of ELV regulation. The scarcity of formal and transparent cost benefit 
estimates also applies to industrial stakeholders. The issue of (lacking) ex ante regulation impact 
analysis for ELV directive and the lack of transparent cost-benefit estimates by industry is 
discussed in Onida (2000) and Zoboli et al. (2000). 15
packaging waste, in which the ‘producer responsibility principle’ has been the 
cornerstone to achieve higher RRR targets
13.  
We will address the possible role of EIs, focussing in particular on the free-take-back 
(FTB) mechanism introduced by Directive 2000/53, in pushing the ELV system toward 
the innovation paths we have defined above
14. We aim at highlighting that the extent to 
which EIs stimulate (policy-desired) innovation path(s) can be different from what 
expected, as result of: (a) the systemic features of the inter-industry innovation process 
and the cost-benefit considerations by single industrial actors; (b) the difficulties in 
giving the instrument the best configuration in practice in terms of effectiveness
15.  
 
4.1. Policy making  and instrument choice 
The policy-makers objective is to minimise the three main ELV-related sources of 
environmental externalities: (a) The dumping of ELVs in the environment; (b) The 
release of pollutants in ELV treatment operations, and (c) The landfilling of ASR at the 
final stage of treatment (see Figure 1). The usual reason underlying the introduction of 
                                                 
13 An extensive discussion of the economics of ‘extended producer responsibility’ is presented in 
OECD (2004) and in particular in the work by Walls (2004). The Directives 1994/62 on 
packaging and packaging waste did not explicitly mention a ‘producer responsibility principle’ 
but gave rise, de facto, to a major case of PRP application in EU environmental policy. The 
Directive 2004/12/EC emending the 1994 directive on packaging and packaging waste, instead 
makes extensive reference to ‘producer responsibility’, also in terms of ‘financial responsibility’. 
The Commission is currently producing an ex post evaluation of the 1994 packaging Directive.  
14 FTB impose car producers to take back free of charge the ELVs of their own make, and its 
inclusion among economic instruments might be questioned by a rigid reference to standard 
classifications. Though the price incentive is not clear cut as for Pigovian taxes and market 
permits, FTB obligations introduce a cost for carmakers that is an incentive to produce more 
recyclable and recoverable cars, i.e. to produce less externalities in the post consumer 
treatment/disposal, in order to reduce the burden of FTB itself. Thus, the incentive mechanism 
of FTB is similar to a tax on externalities when the ‘producer of the good’ is assumed to be the 
‘producer of the externalities’ associated to the post-consumer stage of the good itself. 
Furthermore, FTB is applied to each ELV even after policy targets on RRR are attained, which is 
a common incentive feature of economic instruments, e.g. Pigouvian taxes. The difference with 
CAC and regulatory standards is clear in any case. See also Par. 4.2 and 4.3 and the Appendix 
for a more detailed explanation.  
15 As stated in the Introduction, our main aim is to highlight the mechanism by which EIs can 
influence induced innovation in specific class of policies applied to specific 
industrial/innovation settings. We are not performing an ex post evaluation of policy 
instruments cost-efficiency/effectiveness. Therefore, we think we are not incurring in the 
methodological limitations characterising the impact analysis of a single policy instrument 
outside its policy package. For a methodological note on ex post policy effectiveness evaluation 
see Mazzanti et al. (2003). 16
EIs is the expectation that they are more cost-effective for the achievement of objectives 
(a), (b), (c) as above, in comparison with other instruments. During the ELV policy-
making process (1989-2000), neither EU/national regulators nor industrial stakeholders 
have performed analyses on the possible superiority of EIs over CAC and other 
instruments. However, there are reasonable advantages on the EIs side.  
Concerning externality (a), it is reasonable to expect that reducing or eliminating the 
cost of delivery (by FTB or other instruments, see below) will increase the delivery rate 
to dismantlers. As regards externality (b), the reduction of externalities during ELV 
dismantling and treatment can be pursued by CAC regulation - and it is so in Directive 
2000/53 and all national VAs/regulations. However, by using EIs to cover (part of the) 
additional costs of environmentally-safe ELV dismantling and treatment, the 
development of ‘clean’ and efficient dismantling activities can be promoted, and it is the 
first stage of the ‘market creation path’ we depicted
16. As regards externality (c), in a 
material balance perspective, a reduced landfilled amount of ASR necessarily 
corresponds to higher RRR rates and vice versa, and a reasonable way to achieve it is to 
push industrial actors towards innovation efforts in the upstream phases preceding ASR 
landfilling. However, the achievement of higher RRR rates implies an ‘economic-value 
deficit’ due to missing or very underdeveloped markets for the additional materials. No 
involved sector/industry will voluntarily support it. Therefore, EIs can be introduced to 
reveal and allocate the economic-value deficit to one or more actors. The addressed 
industrial actor(s) should be stimulated to undertake innovation efforts that should 
contribute to achieving RRR targets and, at the same time, to absorb the economic value 
deficit, possibly along the innovation paths depicted above.  
 
4.2. Which economic instrument? 
                                                 
16The main business of car dismantlers is the recovery of high-value spare parts for ‘reuse’. Used 
reconditioned spare parts compete, in a very complex way, with new original spare parts 
(Zoboli et al., 2003).  17
We assume that the depicted framework (Figure 4) summarises the ‘average 
knowledge’ of policy makers concerning the impacts of different EIs. Which are the 
best economic instruments among those in Figure 4 to achieve objectives (a), (b), (c)? 
Even in this case, neither EU/national policy makers nor industrial stakeholders 
produced rigorous economic analyses demonstrating the superiority of the specific EI 
they have chosen in practice (or the superiority of VAs promoted by industrial 
stakeholders).  
Policy makers necessarily have only a partial knowledge of the full impact (direct 
and indirect, short term and long term) of specific instruments either because the policy 
is completely new or because they did not perform a complete ex ante analysis of 
expected impacts
17. Furthermore, the same externality can be addressed by different EIs 
imposed on different actors and markets; and one instrument can address more than 
one externality due to inter-industry technical/economic relationships. Finally, each 
instrument is expected to stimulate specific innovations, which are not full innovation 
paths. Therefore, chains of reactions to the chosen EI should be considered, and the 
‘average knowledge’ could be not complete concerning them, especially for indirect 
effects.  
While ex ante there is an over-choice of instruments, the range considered in ELV 
debate and in practical applications has been restricted to: (1) free take back (FTB), (2) 
recycling fees, and (3) deposit-refund systems. They share various features and each of 
the three actually contains, both in theory and practical formulations, some element of 
the other(s). This seems to fit theoretical suggestions that neutrality of the chosen 
instrument with respect to outcome exists under some assumptions, and there may exist 
a certain degree of substitutability between different instruments targeted to waste-
                                                 
17 In the case of ELV, this ‘average knowledge’ may dynamically evolve in parallel with policy 
making processes and industrial responses (Den Hond, 1996) but we simply assume it as given 
at the time of policy design. 18
related objectives
18. We think, instead, that instruments have very different features and 
implications in terms of cost-benefit distribution between actors and, as a consequence, 
in terms of induced innovation and our ‘innovation paths’.  
Free take back (Directive 2000/53/EC). The FTB mechanism implies that the 
consumer, i.e. the final car owner, can deliver his/her car to a dismantling facility for 
free. The producer (carmakers) are responsible for the cost of ELV management. 
Through FTB, dismantlers receive, de facto, financial resources from car makers to 
perform additional dismantling for providing more materials to recyclers in the 
downstream part of the RRR chain (see the Appendix for more details). Therefore, FTB 
could be, ex ante, a good candidate as the best EI. In fact, a FTB allocating the costs to 
the car industry creates: (a) incentives to final car owners to deliver ELV to dismantlers 
(without payment); (b) financial resources (from carmakers) for dismantlers and 
possibly other industries in the RRR chains; (c) incentives to improve recyclability, 
recoverability and reusability (RRR-ability) at the car-design and car-making level in 
order to reduce the burden of FTB (the easier it is to RRR a car, the lower the cost of 
FTB). Therefore, it potentially addresses all the three objectives of ELV policy described 
above. Actually, the key policy concept behind the FTB of ELV Directive proposal of 
1997 has been that the costs of higher RRR rates should not be supported by consumers 
and/or dismantlers/recyclers because the high costs of car RRR are a consequence of 
car-making choices at the upstream level of the chain, i.e. design and material mix 
(Onida, 2000).  
Recycling fees (the Netherlands). The approach to ELV management and EIs 
developed in the Netherlands during the 1990s is based on a ‘disposal fee’ paid by the 
first owner of a new car registered in the country, coupled with a ‘recycling premium’ 
                                                 
18 See Pearce and Brisson (1995) and DETR (1993). A static-oriented neoclassic analysis of waste 
policies leads to a theoretical equivalence in terms of welfare and innovation effects of different 
instruments implemented at various levels of the waste production/management chain. The 
approach can be valuable when dealing with relatively simple systems of agents and 
innovations, e.g. municipal waste management systems. It can loose explicative power for highly 
complex issues characterised by a significant diversity of industries, technical complexity of the 19
paid to dismantlers, transporters and recyclers for the extra-cost they support in 
increasing RRR rates according to planned targets. The system is managed by a private 
company, the ARN, acting on the provisions of Dutch legislation. Although this form of 
recycling fee formally fulfils the requirement of EU Directive 2000/53 that the final 
owner have not to pay for ELV management, the first car owner will bear the cost, and 
he/she is generally also the final owner of an ELV in normal sequence of new-old cars 
rotation. Furthermore, such a scheme does not fulfil the ‘(extended) producer-
responsibility principle’ of Directive 2000/53 as car makers do not pay for ELV 
management. Nevertheless, the Dutch recycling fee addresses all the three main 
externalities and objectives of an ELV policy, and reflects the idea that, in a country 
without a nationally-based car industry, the dismantling and recycling activities must be 
financially supported to be viable. The Dutch scheme has been adapted to Directive 
2000/53/EC in terms of targets and their timing (see www.arn.nl) and, recently, it has 
been recently questioned as possibly implying state aid to dismantlers and recyclers. 
The Decision 2002/204/EC concluded that there is not state aid
19.  
Deposit-refund system (Sweden). The use of a deposit-refund system for cars disposal 
in Sweden started as early as 1975 according to a specific regulations then amended 
several times. The producers and importers of new or old cars have to pay a ‘recycling 
fee’ on behalf of the potential buyer, when the car enters the Swedish market. The fee 
is then included in the price of the new car. The amount of the fee is fixed by the 
Government and it is paid to the Vehicle Disposal Fund. The revenue of the Fund is 
then used for paying ‘scrapping premiums’ to the final car owner in conjunction with 
the deregistration of the vehicle for scrapping. The value of the ELV is determined by 
negotiations between the final owner and the dismantler. Even though dismantlers ask 
for money to the final owner in order to dismantle old cars of very low value (thus 
enjoying, de facto, part of the scrapping premium) they do not receive a scrapping 
                                                                                                                                             
goods and externalities involved, and where industrial innovation is the key for achieving policy 
targets.   20
premium directly from the Fund. Instead, if the dismantler buys the car before 
deregistration, then he receives the premium as being the final owner. While waiting 
the EU Directive, after an heated debate between regulators and the Swedish car 
industry, in 1997 the Ordinance on Producers Responsibility for Vehicles created a 
recovery system wherein car manufacturers had to organise the car scrapping of their 
cars and pay for the corresponding costs. This did not eliminate the previous system, 
however, and ‘producer responsibility’ coexists with a deposit refund system at the 
consumer level
20. 
The three EI formulations sketched above suggest that the EI is directly applied to 
some economic actors, but it is expected (by policy makers) to generate spillovers on 
other actors due to technical or economic (market) links among them, as drawn out in 
Fig.1, and then to develop an “innovation path”. In other words, the EI-based incentive 
placed at one stage/industry have to be transmitted to other parts of the ELV chain to 
stimulate a set of innovative reactions that contribute to policy objectives, in particular 
those of type (c), i.e. to increase RRR. However, in systemic innovation settings where 
industrial actors possess some degrees of freedom for choosing innovative reactions 
according to their cost-benefit balances, this incentive-effect transmission cannot be 
taken for granted ex ante.  
This key issue of the relationship between EIs and innovation can be highlighted by 
looking at the implications of an EI configuration in terms of induced innovation paths. 
We shall analyse the implications of a specific FTB configuration.  
 
4.3. FTB and innovation paths 
The Appendix illustrates a simplified competitive market for ELVs (supply by final 
owners and demand by dismantlers) and the comparative statics of the FTB 
configuration of the 1997 Directive Proposal. The final car-owner is allowed to deliver 
                                                                                                                                             
19 Arguments in favour of different implications of FTB and recycling fee are proposed by Palmer 
and Walls (1999).  21
his/her old car to a dismantling facility at zero cost. It means that, if he/she has to pay 
the dismantler for delivering the car (i.e. the value/price of ELV is negative), he/she can 
be fully reimbursed by the producer of his/her car. The key point is that, in this form of 
FTB, dismantlers can freely establish the price for the ELVs they buy from final owners. 
As shown in the Appendix, it is in the dismantlers interest to pay negative prices for 
ELVs, while the final owner is fully reimbursed by the carmaker and then it is likely 
he/she becomes indifferent to ELV prices. The car industry bears the full cost without 
participating in the transaction.  
This is equivalent to a tax on ELV paid by carmakers, of which the revenue is 
recycled to dismantlers, who establish the tax level. Within this form of “free price - full 
reimbursement” FTB (FPFR-FTB), the possibility of a transfer to dismantlers in excess of 
the actual incremental dismantling costs cannot be ruled out, in particular if the 
existence of a great number of non-professional dismantlers in Europe is considered. In 
other words, they might enjoy a ‘regulation-induced rent’. Furthermore, in as far as the 
starting situation (before FTB) is one in which average positive ELV prices do prevail in 
the transactions between final owners and dismantlers, as is the case in various Member 
States, final-owners (i.e. consumers) may have a net opportunity cost because FPFR-
FTB creates pressure on negative ELV prices
21.  
In terms of innovation, FPFR-FTB may stimulate the ‘material-market creation path’, 
i.e. the path preferred by EU policy makers, both if the incentive from the EI would be 
‘internalised’ upstream in car design/making in order to save FTB costs, and if 
dismantlers transmit part of the monetary incentives from FPFR-FTB to downstream 
recyclers. Therefore, the influence of FPFR-FTB on the policy-desired innovation paths 
depends on inter-industry incentive transmission. Industries, however, are not passive 
actors. They have the possibility to pursue alternative market actions and innovation 
options, in order to (re)allocate costs and capture benefits associated to the instrument.  
                                                                                                                                             
20 See Zoboli et al. (2003) for details of the Swedish scheme.  22
The possible different reactions are shown in Figure 5. In case A, innovation can 
proceed along the “material market creation path” by creating more recycling/reuse of 
parts and materials. The new recycling/reuse markets, however, can be self-sustained if 
innovations on recycling/reuse actually take place. Carmakers can make selected 
adaptations in design/material mix favourable to recycling. The cost of FTB can be 
gradually reduced by the innovation process. 
A less optimistic possibility is that innovations in recycling are insufficient to create 
self-sustained markets (case B). Carmakers can then make different choices according to 
their technological capabilities and the FTB costs they have to support. The first 
possible choice is to preserve the material mix and the present car design/assembling 
approaches while accepting high FTB costs (case B.1). Innovation incentives in the ELV 
system will be low and the main result could be new recycling markets steadily 
subsidised by consumers through higher new-car prices. The second possible choice is 
to increase their economic involvement in downstream operations to "control" FTB 
prices applied by dismantlers (case B.2). In this case, the “power” of the car industry on 
dismantling/recycling can become structurally significant with FPFR-FTB (why not 
greater than within VAs ‘dominated’ by the car industry?). The third choice for 
carmakers (case B.3) may be to make radical design/material adaptations in favour of 
easily-recycled (traditional) materials thus reducing FTB costs but pushing innovation 
along the “radical substitution path”. 
Essentially,  even in the ex ante perspective, a FPFR-FTB mechanism may have 
different outcomes in terms of innovation and innovation paths: (i) innovations in car 
recyclability and new self-sustained recycling activities (‘material market’ and ‘energy 
market’ creation); (ii) little innovation impacts on car design together with new 
recycling markets indirectly subsidised by the consumers; (iii) “backward-oriented” 
                                                                                                                                             
21 The final owner actually pays nothing because the car dealer/maker will reimburse for the 
negative price, but he/she is suffering a loss if a positive price for his/her ELV prevailed before 
FPFR-FTB. 23
innovations, based on the interruption of trends towards advanced polymer-based 
materials difficult to recycle.  
In at least one case, there is an ‘innovation incentive dissipation’, because the 
allocation to the car industry of the economic-value deficit of higher RRR rates does not 
give rise to the expected incentive transmission and innovation path and, instead, only 
leads to higher car prices
22.  
The final version of the Directive 2000/53 seems to take into account the possible 
shortcoming of a FPFR-FTB by establishing a sort of ‘cost-sharing FTB’, which paves the 
way to contractual agreements between dismantlers and car makers not yet fully clear 
in terms of induced ‘innovation paths’
23.  
 
4.4 EIs performance with voluntary agreements 
EIs and VAs have long been debated as alternative approaches to ELV policy, the 
former being supported by policy makers and the latter by carmakers. The two 
approaches should be considered jointly after the Art. 10(3) of the ELV Directive 
2000/53, which allows for Art. 5(4) on FTB -or ‘equivalent measures’- to be 
implemented by Member States within national enforceable agreements
24. How can the 
incentive effects of EIs change? VAs including forms of FTB, as the German and the 
                                                 
22 Other transaction costs possibly associated to a FTB instrument are suggested by Palmer and 
Walls (1999). 
23 Art 5(4) states: “Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the delivery of 
the vehicle to an authorised treatment facility in accordance with paragraph 3 occurs without 
any cost for the final holder and/or owner as a result of the vehicle's having no or a negative 
market value. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that producers meet all, 
or a significant part of, the costs of the implementation of this measure and/or take back end-of 
life vehicles under the same conditions as referred to in the first subparagraph. (…).” (our Italics) 
24 Art. 10(3) states: “Provided that the objectives set out in this Directive are achieved, Member 
States may transpose the provisions set out in Articles 4(1), 5(1), 7(1), 8(1), 8(3) and 9(2) and 
specify the detailed rules of implementation of Article 5(4) by means of agreements between the 
competent authorities and the economic sectors concerned. Such agreements shall meet the 
following requirements: (a) agreements shall be enforceable; (b) agreements need to specify 
objectives with the corresponding deadlines; (c) agreements shall be published in the national 
official journal or an official document equally accessible to the public and transmitted to the 
Commission; (d) the results achieved under an agreement shall be monitored regularly, reported 
to the competent authorities and to the Commission and made available to the public under the 
conditions set out in the agreement; (e) the competent authorities shall make provisions to 
examine the progress reached under an agreement; (f) in case of non-compliance with an 24
Swedish schemes, are too recent to supply sound evidence, but the features of VAs can 
suggest some possible implications for innovation.  
The incentive structure of VAs is not standardised because it derives from tailored 
contractual agreements. In most VAs, cost-benefit distribution is, in fact, implicitly 
defined by the distribution of industrial tasks and, because of the uncertainties still 
associated to some innovations, they are not fully accountable even by industrial actors 
themselves. In principle, given the features of the ELV problem, VAs can be good for 
innovation if they are shaped to reflect interdependency between innovations inside an 
innovation path, in particular a ‘material market creation’ path, and the contractual 
agreements reduce the probability that one industry enjoys extra-profits or free-rides at 
the expenses of other actors. In practice, these positive properties are not yet 
demonstrated for all VAs and observed regularities are weak (see Zoboli et al., 2000).  
According to the formulation of Art 10(3) of Directive 200/53/EC, VAs can be a way  
‘producer responsibility’, or the FTB of Art 5(4), is implemented. At the same time, the 
introduction of FTB-like instruments by direct regulation is threatened in the case VA’s 
do not comply with Directive’s objectives. The two provisions together can give rise to 
balanced effects in terms of cost distribution and innovation. On the one hand, the 
burden of a FTB inside a VA can be lower for the car industry than the FTB would be 
imposed by direct regulation (as in our analysis of Par 4). The car industry, therefore, 
seems to be worse-off in those countries without VAs, where Art. 5.4 must be 
implemented by direct regulation. On the other hand, to avoid EIs be introduced 
directly by policy makers, the VA must be effective in terms of targets and objectives 
achievement. This can prevent a too much unequal cost distribution inside a VA, 
possibly reflecting industrial and market power, because unequal distribution can 
impair cooperative actions aimed at targets achievement. Therefore, the car industry 
cannot avoid the responsibility of a significant part of the burden in order to escape a 
                                                                                                                                             
agreement Member States must implement the relevant provisions of this Directive by legislative, 
regulatory or administrative measures.” (our Italics).  25
FTB introduced by direct regulation. All in all, the combination between VAs and Eis, 
which has been a ‘political compromise’ in Directive 2000/53, seems to be favourable to 
effectiveness and innovation on technical grounds because it reduces the possibility 
policy-induced unsatisfactory cost distributions push actors to deviate from cooperation.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The case of end-of-life vehicles (ELVs) can be representative of a class of policy 
issues in which the dynamic-incentive effect of EIs takes place in very complex 
industrial systems. To achieve policy objectives and targets, interrelated sequences of 
single innovations in both upstream (car making) and downstream (car 
recycling/recovery) of the ELV system, which give rise to different ‘innovation paths’, 
should take place. Our main aim was to explore how the introduction of EIs can 
influence the behaviour of industrial actors towards different ‘innovation paths’. This is 
equivalent to explore if the chosen EI and/or its practical configuration can be 
considered as being neutral with respect to dynamic-efficiency. The possible impact of 
a free take-back (FTB) instrument on innovation paths has been considered.  
Our main conclusion is that, when EIs are introduced inside complex and systemic 
industrial settings,  their dynamic efficiency can critically depend, even ex ante, on 
which specific industry/activity the EI is directly applied, on its position in the 
innovation process, on its market power and its relationships with other industries, on 
the technological and organisational capabilities of these industries. In other words, 
different innovation paths, including paths not preferred by policy makers, may emerge 
from the matching of actors’ innovation role and actors’ (expected) share of the policy-
induced cost/benefit impact. Differently from static neoclassical approaches, where the 
cost/benefit impact of the EI and its formulation is neutral with respect to policy 
effectiveness, the effects of EIs in systemic and dynamic settings critically depend on 
where, along the ‘production chain’, and how, in terms of net cost allocation, the 
incentive is introduced. Consequently, it is also relevant the extent to which the 26
incentive allocated to a certain industry is transmitted to other industries thus generating 
second-order effects downward or upward along the chain, i.e. whether a cooperative 
or a conflicting behaviour towards innovation is stimulated. Disregarding these effects 
can imply a ‘dissipation’ of innovation incentives, and possibly the generation of 
‘regulation-induced rents’ for some actors.  
Some policy implications may be sketched. Firstly, dynamic-efficiency effects of EIs 
must be the core of policy concerns when objective achievement depends on 
innovation. EIs choice should be ‘de-linked’ from standard general principles, as 
Polluter Pays Principle or Producer Responsibility Principle, and it should be considered 
in an effectiveness perspective. The take-off and completion of a preferred ‘innovation 
path’ should be the priority in choosing and configuring instruments while cost-benefit 
distribution and equity considerations should be instrumental to put in motion the 
appropriate sequence of innovative reactions by the economic actors. 
Secondly, despite their ex ante efficiency-related properties, some EIs may be 
ineffective when implemented because the ‘targeted disturbance’ they introduce into 
the system is re-elaborated in unexpected ways by actors’ behaviours, including 
‘innovation-incentive dissipation’, ‘regulation-induced rents’, and cost transfer to final 
consumers through prices. Then, the analysis of the innovation process involved, of the 
elements of market power, and of economic-value flows inside the system should come 
before the choice of policy instruments.  
Thirdly, PRP policies that involve many industries in interrelated innovation 
processes should consider EIs in conjunction with ‘enforceable’ inter-industrial 
agreements. This is the final choice of Directive 2000/53/EC on ELVs. Although VAs do 
not necessarily represent the most efficient/equitable approach, in high-
interdependency settings the reciprocal commitments established by VAs can create a 
cross-industrial control mechanism as well as a shared interest towards effective 
innovations. Policy-induced cost-benefit conflicts between industries, which may be 27
stimulated by certain EIs formulations or direct-regulation, could then be reduced by 
using EIs as a threat in properly designed VAs.   
These conclusions might be relevant vis à vis other policies addressing ‘multiple 
industry – PRP’ problems, as the implementation of the 2004 Directive on packaging 
waste, the directives on waste of electric and electronics equipments (WEEE), and the 
on-going development of Integrated Product Policy (IPP), which shifts the policy 
perspective from “extended producer responsibility” to “extended product 
responsibility”.  
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APPENDIX: The market for ELVs and the comparative static of FTB 
 
Figure A.1 and A.2 illustrate, in a simplified way, the comparative statics of free take-back (FTB) 
in the market for ELVs. We assume that (i) ELVs arising at a specific time are homogenous in 
terms of “age” and technical features, (ii) there is just one (national) competitive market, and (iii) 
one equilibrium price for ELVs, at which all transactions take place exists 
26. The number of ELVs 
                                                 
26 The scheme may nevertheless approximate a market for one specific category of ELVs of the 31
delivered to dismantlers by final-owners is represented on the horizontal axis. The negative part 
of the cost/price vertical axis is placed upside in figures.  
Figure A.1 describes a market with a negative equilibrium price before FTB (e.g. the German 
market). The supply curve for ELVs by final owners (So) is downward sloping for negative 
prices (i.e. the propensity to deliver ELVs increases for decreasingly negative prices) and become 
vertical for zero to positive prices at the maximum number of cars becoming ELVs at that time 
(i.e. final-owners will be ready to deliver all their ELVs for non-negative prices). The cars not 
delivered are illegally abandoned into the environment, thus accepting the risk of fines and legal 
costs against the cost of car delivery. The demand curve for ELVs by dismantlers (Do) is upward 
sloping, starting from a positive price. The dismantling industry has marginal increasing costs in 
terms of number of treated cars. Dismantlers are willing to pay a positive price for ELVs for a 
relatively low number of ELVs, but, in order to treat an increasing number of ELVs, they are 
willing to pay lower and lower positive prices, until they are wiling to pay negative prices for 
large quantities
27. The equilibrium price (-po) is initially negative (by assumption) and the 
quantity of ELVs treated (qo) is less than the maximum available number (i.e. some ELVs will 
not be delivered and then  illegally dumped into the environment).  
We assume that FTB reflecting ‘producer responsibility’ consists of a full reimbursement from 
a carmaker to final owners for negative prices the latter receive for an ELV of the carmaker’s 
brand. It is introduced together with the obligation for dismantlers to attain higher dismantling 
rates in terms of car weight (i.e. incremental costs per each car treated) in order to arrive at 
higher RRR rates. Let us assume for simplicity that incremental dismantling costs are net costs, 
i.e. additional dismantled parts/materials have not a market value. As in the FTB included in EU 
Directive proposal of 1997, dismantlers are free to establish demand prices for ELVs. The FTB 
scheme is a "free price – full reimbursement” one (FPFR-FTB). With FPFR-FTB, both supply and 
demand curves shift. The possibility of full reimbursement for the costs of ELV delivered induce 
final-owners to deliver all their ELVs and the supply curve will shift rightward to become SFTB 
(i.e. vertical at the maximum number qFTB, completely inelastic to paid or received prices). 
Given demand prices for ELVs are freely established, the change of the demand curve of 
dismantlers cannot be defined ex ante. The increasing costs of incremental dismantling would 
surely shift the demand curve upward in order to cover the incremental costs, and the 
willingness to pay positive prices decreases. FTB affects the price at which ELVs are accepted by 
dismantlers: this price is likely to become increasingly negative.  
 
Figure A.1. FTB introduction with initial negative equilibrium price for ELVs  
 
                                                                                                                                             
same age where competition between dismantlers pushes towards one single equilibrium price. 
27 A slightly more realistic interpretation is that the curve represents the demand by a very large 
number of very small dismantlers with different efficiency in treating the same cars. The more 
efficient dismantlers have low treatment costs and are ready to pay positive prices whereas 
marginally arising quantities of ELVs will be treated by less efficient dismantlers with higher 
operating costs, the latter being ready to buy ELVs at negative prices only (i.e. they receive ELVs 
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It is likely that the demand curve starts at zero prices because, with the introduction of FTB, 
no dismantler is ready to pay a positive price for ELV. The demand increases as a consequence 
(in the negative price space) for increasingly negative prices (DFTB). Provided that final owners 
are reimbursed for whatever price they have to pay to dismantlers, and that carmakers do not 
participate in the transaction, there are not boundaries to the upward shift of the demand curve. 
The exact position and slope of the demand curve is therefore not defined ex ante regardless 
the component related to actual incremental costs of dismantling. The equilibrium price might 
be -pFTB2, while the equilibrium quantity is qFTB (the maximum number of ELVs available at 
that time).  
In terms of cost-benefit balances, FTB improves the environmental performance because it is 
reasonable that no car will be abandoned and an increasing amount of materials/parts will be 
dismantled (and hopefully recovered/reused/recycled). The dismantlers see all their incremental 
costs covered by payments they receive from final-owners (area -pFTB2 x qFTB), thus the 
possibility that they can enjoy extra-profits by establishing high negative prices cannot be ruled 
out. They might actually enjoy a ‘regulation-induced rent’ corresponding to the part of the 
producer surplus exceeding total incremental costs and a normal profit on them. Final owners 
are better off compared with the non-FTB situation (when they paid area po x qo) because they 
are fully reimbursed and do not pay whatever negative price established by dismantlers. 
Carmakers support all incremental costs and possible free lunches (if any) through transfers to 
dismantlers (area -pFTB2 x qFTB).  33
Figure A.2 illustrates the same mechanism for initial market equilibrium at positive prices for 
ELVs before FTB is introduced (e.g. the French market). Two main differences arise compared 
with the previous situation: (a) The demand curve for dismantlers is flatter because we assumed 
they are willing to pay higher prices for ELVs (i.e. positive prices even for large quantities); (b) 
The equilibrium quantity treated is presumably at the maximum level qo/qFTB even in the initial 
situation (i.e. ELVs are not abandoned given a positive equilibrium price).  
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FPFR-FTB works as above, but cost-benefit implications are different. The environment gains 
only as a consequence of an incremental dismantling of each ELV (and 
reuse/recovery/recycling), since all ELVs were already delivered before FPFR-FTB. The transfer 
to dismantlers will be paid by both final-owners and carmakers. If, as depicted above, with 
FPFR-FTB and increasing dismantling costs, the dismantlers are not willing to pay positive prices 
to car final-owners; then final-owners face an opportunity cost (corresponding to the area +po x 
qFTB) which is essentially a transfer to dismantlers. Carmakers pay a transfer to dismantlers 
corresponding to the equilibrium negative price -pFTB applied to the number of cars accepted 
for dismantling (qFTB). 
To simplify the analysis, we have not considered that higher dismantling rates of each car 
may give rise also to direct benefits for dismantlers (together with higher costs) if they are able 
to sell additional dismantled components and materials at positive prices. Although it does not 
change the mechanism depicted for FTB, this enlarges the uncertainty on its cost-benefit 34
implications. In a first scenario, FPFR-FTB covers all the incremental costs of dismantling and, 
then, dismantled materials/parts are offered at “zero prices” to the downstream recycling 
industries. Another scenario is that FPFR-FTB does not cover all incremental dismantling costs, 
and the ‘normal’ loss to dismantlers is only reduced. Another possibility is that, although FPFR-
FTB covers all the incremental costs, dismantlers are able to extract positive prices for 
dismantled materials/parts. With a complete freedom of establishing FPFR-FTB levels, all 
possibilities emerge; as a consequence the implications for the development of recycling chains 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2. Examples of innovative activities on ELV by selected European carmakers  
Renault SA.  •  ELV collection, spare-parts recovery, material recycling, energy recovery, car 
recyclability 
•  R&D efforts on plastic recycling 
•  Dismantlers contracted by Renault in 1997 were 270  
•  An average reuse/recovery/recycling of 82.9% in the Renault system is calculated 
PSA - Peugeot 
Citroen 
•  Design of vehicles to be 90%-recyclable from 2002 
•  Recycling of end-of-life parts and re-use of certain parts 
•  DFR: reduction of the diversity of materials 
•  Increasing use of recycled materials in new cars 
Adam Opel AG  •  ELV recovery and car design.  
•  Network of 234 dismantlers in 1998 
•  DFR manuals for internal use 
•  Recyclability coefficients calculated for internal use 
•  Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) for materials and components 
BMW  •  ELV recovery and car recycling 
•  Network of 90 associated dismantlers 
•  DFR/DFD: “Dismantling parts charts” containing guidelines and recommendations
•  Recycling coefficients and indexes of “suitability for recycling” of components and 
parts 
Daimler-Chrysler  •  DFD/DFR guidelines for internal use 
•  Simplification of material regime by reducing the number of plastics 
•  LCA is made for evaluating material alternatives 
Ford Motor 
Company 
•  Restrictions on hazardous substances DFR guidelines 
•  Parts marking and material coding standards 
•  Targets for recyclability of new models and use of recycled materials 
•  Network of 170-180 dismantlers in Germany 
•  LCA is used for material and component selection 
FIAT  •  FARE system on dismantling, the reuse of recycled materials and ASR energy 
recovery 
•  Network of 312 associated dismantlers in 1998 
•  Recovery rate is calculated at 82% of car weight 
•  Recyclability coefficients for internal use 
•  LCA applied to materials and components 
Volvo Car 
Corporation 
•  DFD/DFR together with car recycling and ASR energy recovery 
•  Guidelines on design to be applied to the parts and components of new models 
•  Cooperation on recyclability with component and material suppliers 
•  Network of 70 dismantlers in Sweden 




Figure 3. Innovation paths 
  Material market creation Energy market creation   Radical substitution 
Implications in terms of 
policy objectives 
Increase RRR rates, 
especially material 
recycling and parts reuse 
Reduce ASR landfilling 
by preventing its 
production or by ASR-
material recovery 
 
Increase RRR rates, 
especially energy 
recovery and parts reuse 
Reduce ASR landfilling 
by developing its 
alternative use 
 
Can be either substitute 
for or complement to 
“material market 
creation”  
Increase RRR rates, 
especially recycling.  by 
changing car material 
mix towards material 
easily (i.e. economically) 
recyclable 
Reduce ASR by reducing 
the share of materials 
difficult to recycle 
 
Can be substitute for both 
“material“ and “energy” 
market creation” if they 
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Innovations in plastic 
recycling 
Innovations in recycling 
of other car materials 
Innovative outlets for 
recycled car materials 
Innovations in material 
recovery of ASR 
Cooperative research 
Energy recovery 
technologies for ASR 
Innovative energy uses in 
different industries  
Cooperative research 
Change car material mix 
against (composite) 
polymeric materials or 
other materials difficult to 
recycle at present 
conditions 
Adaptations of other 
aspects of car design and 
making 
 














Some material recyclers  
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materials producers and 
recyclers 
Trade-off with other car 
innovation trajectories 








Trade-off with car 
lightness and 
energy/emission saving 
Keys: DFD: design for dismantling; DFR: design for recycling; ASR: automobile shredding 
residue. 3
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Keys: DFD: design for dismantling; DFR: design for recycling; ASR: automobile shredding 
residue 4
Figure 5. Alternative expected effects of “FPFR-FTB” in terms of innovation paths 
Starting impact (by 
assumption) 
 
Carmakers pay for FTB and dismantlers receive the corresponding flow of economic resources 
through last car-owners. FTB-related incentive is transmitted to recycling activities through 
reduced costs and increased economic quality of materials from incremental dismantling. New 
recycling markets are incentive-based, and innovations in material recycling and car recyclability 





do occur downstream  
Selective innovations in 
DFR and DFD occur 
upstream to help 
recycling 
B 
Innovations in material recycling are not enough to create self-
sustained markets for recycled materials. FTB-based incentives 
become subsidies to dismantling and recycling activities 
 
According to levels of FTB and their technological capabilities, 




Creation of a closed 
material loop, i.e. 
increased use of 
recycled materials in car 
making and other 
industries 
Carmakers can pay 
decreasing amounts of 
FTB due to the value of 
additional recycled 
materials  
Carmakers can pay 
decreasing amount of 
FTB by making only 
selective adaptations in 






mix and pay high FTB 
costs.  
FTB is likely to be 
passed to consumers 




integration by the car 
industry may occur to 








reducing FTB costs  
Prevailing innovation 
path 
Innovation may go 




interrupted at the 
recycling level 
New recycling steadily 
subsidised by 
consumers 
Innovation may go 
along “material market 
creation path” with a 
change in the 
structure of the ELV 
system 
Innovation may go 
along the “radical 
substitution path” 
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